Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 79

Issue 3

Article 3

Summer 2022

Foreword: Centering Intersectionality in Human Rights Discourse
Johanna Bond
Washington and Lee University School of Law, bondj@wlu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Law
Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Johanna Bond, Foreword: Centering Intersectionality in Human Rights Discourse, 79 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 953 (2022).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol79/iss3/3
This Foreword is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington
and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee
Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Foreword: Centering Intersectionality
in Human Rights Discourse
Johanna Bond*
In the last decade, intersectionality theory has gained
traction as a lens through which to analyze international
human rights issues. Intersectionality theory is the notion that
multiple systems of oppression intersect in peoples’ lives and
are mutually constitutive, meaning that when, for example,
race and gender intersect, the experience of discrimination
goes beyond the formulaic addition of race discrimination and
gender discrimination to produce a unique, intersectional
experience of discrimination.1 The understanding that
intersecting systems of oppression affect different groups
differently is central to intersectionality theory. As such, the
theory invites us to think about inter-group differences (i.e.,
differences between women and men) and intra-group
differences (i.e., differences in the experiences of
discrimination and rights violations between white women and
women of color).2
Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term intersectionality in
the late 1980s and has been the major intellectual driver of
intersectionality theory in the years since. Crenshaw explains
intersectionality theory as an outgrowth of the experiences of
Black women in the United States: “[b]ecause of their
intersectional identity as both women and of color within
discourses that are shaped to respond to one or the other,
* Sydney and Frances Lewis Professor of Law, Washington & Lee
University School of Law.
1. See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection
of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).
2. JOHANNA BOND, GLOBAL INTERSECTIONALITY AND CONTEMPORARY
HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (2021).
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women of color are marginalized within both.”3 Crenshaw, and
other critical race feminists, noted that feminist theories based
on “formal equality,” “cultural or relational” feminism, and
“dominance” feminism largely reflected the experiences of
white women and excluded women of color from the analysis.4
Crenshaw highlighted this issue in her article, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color.5 There, Crenshaw demonstrated that
women’s experiences with violence are deeply interwoven with
race and class. Importantly, Crenshaw argued that the
intersection of race and gender in one’s life leads to experiences
that are qualitatively different than the aggregation of race
and gender subordination. Her work also integrated, and built
upon, the transformative scholarship of feminists from the
Global South, such as Chandra Talpade Mohanty6 and Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak.7 Although outside the scope of this brief
Introduction, I recognize the rich connections between
intersectionality theory and critiques stemming from the Third
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) school.8
In the context of international human rights,
intersectionality offers an invaluable lens through which to
explore complex human rights violations. In that vein, the
Washington and Lee Law Review held the annual Lara D. Gass
Symposium on March 10–11, 2022 to delve into the application
of intersectionality in the field of international human rights
law. The Symposium brought together scholars and activists
from around the world to discuss the relevance and importance
of intersectionality in human rights activism and scholarship.
3. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241, 1244 (1993) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins].
4. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 586-87 (1990).
5. See generally Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 3.
6. See Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Under Western Eyes: Feminist
Scholarship and Colonial Discourses, 2 BOUNDARY 333, 338 (1994).
7. See Gayatri Chravorty Spivak, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing
Historiography, in SELECTED SUBALTERN STUDIES 3, 13 (Ranajit Guha &
Gayatri Spivak eds., 1988).
8. See Makua Matua, What is TWAIL?, 94 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIL
ANN. MEETING 31, 37 (2000).
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The group of experts included two members of the United
Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (the “CEDAW Committee”) as
well as a range of academics who share a commitment to the
global application of intersectionality theory. As evidenced by
these experts’ varied chapters in this Volume, the theory’s
applicability to human rights law is wide-ranging, and the
future of intersectional research in the context of human rights
is still developing. The field of human rights law, and
questions about the evolution of intersectionality theory as
applied to human rights, will require ongoing inquiry and
scholarly development by human rights scholars. My hope is
that the scholarship introduced below sets the stage for that
continued development.
In 2000, a woman identified as “A.S.” from the Romani
ethnic minority group in Hungary was the victim of coerced
sterilization.9 A.S. faced discrimination in Hungary based on
the intersection of gender and ethnicity, and, in 2004, she
sought remedies from the CEDAW Committee. After reviewing
her complaint, CEDAW recognized the gender-based
discrimination A.S. faced, but was silent on the question of
racial or ethnic bias. None of the remedies recommended by
CEDAW addressed the intersectional complexity of the
discrimination she experienced. CEDAW’s recommendations
did not address deficiencies in medical care specifically
available in Romani communities. The recommendations also
failed to acknowledge a racially motivated effort to decrease
the birth rate within Romani communities. As a result, the
CEDAW Committee’s remedies failed to capture and remediate
the full scope of human rights violations that A.S. experienced.
Because this case dates back to the early 2000s, it is
unsurprising that the CEDAW Committee did not engage in
extensive intersectional analysis. Times are changing and the
CEDAW Committee, like the other United Nations human
rights treaty bodies, is beginning to embrace intersectionality
theory in its analysis.
Sexual violence in armed conflict presents another
example of an intersectional human rights violation when
9. A.S. v. Hungary, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Communication No. 4/2004,
CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004.

956

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 953 (2022)

victims are targeted based on, for example, gender and
ethnicity or religion. Since 2017, Burmese security forces have
reportedly raped hundreds of Rohingya Muslim women as part
of a large-scale campaign of ethnic cleansing. Gender,
ethnicity, and religion intersect in the targeting of Rohingya
women for sexual violence. When human rights actors
intervene on behalf of victims of sexual violence in armed
conflict, they must understand the intersectional complexity of
the human rights violations if they hope to offer meaningful
redress to victims.
In the last fifty years, women’s human rights activists
have fought for, and achieved, greater recognition of the range
and type of human rights violations commonly perpetrated
against women across the globe. In the fight for greater
recognition of women’s human rights, activists and scholars
have emphasized the shared experiences of women in order to
build strategic coalitions among women. The emphasis on
women qua women amplified support for the global movement
to promote women’s human rights. However, eliding the
differences among women came at a great cost. As Whelan and
Goodwin note in this Volume, white feminism has been
criticized “for essentializing and universalizing white women’s
experience as if it represents all women’s experience” and has
“ignored race, class, sexual identity, and other experiences to
the neglect and detriment of all women.”10 This narrow focus
on gender has limited discussions of other identity categories
such as race, ethnicity, class, religion, sexual orientation,
gender identity, age, and disability which exist within the
women’s human rights movement. Nonetheless, in the last
twenty years, activists and scholars have started to explore the
ways in which these varied identities intersect in the lived
experiences of human rights victims, and many human rights
organizations around the world have now embraced
intersectionality as an analytical framework that informs their
advocacy work.
The United Nations (U.N.) has similarly begun to
integrate intersectional analyses. In the early to mid-2000s,
the U.N. was slow to embrace intersectionality in its work to
10. Allison M. Whelan & Michele Goodwin, Abortion Rights and
Disability Equality: A New Constitutional Battleground, 79 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 956, 1002 (2022).
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protect and promote human rights. The U.N., working
primarily through its human rights treaty-monitoring bodies,
increasingly touches on intersectional concepts to analyze
human rights violations. In my previous scholarship, I have
argued that international actors, including representatives of
the United Nations, must more aggressively incorporate
intersectionality theory into human rights work in order to
maintain relevance in twenty-first century human rights
discourse. Intersectionality theory continues to gain ground
within UN human rights discourses, which will ultimately
benefit victims seeking redress through UN mechanisms.
In 2000, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD)—one of the U.N.’s expert committees
that
ensure
compliance
with
core
human
rights
treaties11—issued a general recommendation entitled
Gender-Related Aspects of Racial Discrimination, also known
as General Recommendation 25. This guidance was one of the
first significant efforts by any U.N. treaty body to explore and
promote the concept of intersectionality. Since 2000, the treaty
bodies have continued to sporadically make efforts to promote
intersectionality within the work of the U.N. Although
encouraging, much work remains before intersectionality is
fully integrated into the work of the U.N. treaty bodies.
The CEDAW Committee exemplifies both the steps the
U.N. has taken toward integrating intersectional analysis, as
well as the shortcomings that still remain. Since A.S.’s case,
the Committee has begun to incorporate intersectional analysis
into its consideration of human rights violations. In recent
years, the Committee’s reports and other documents have
included
references
to
“multiple”
discrimination,
discrimination affecting “particularly vulnerable” women, and,
in some cases, to “intersectional” forms of discrimination.12
11. Those treaties include the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Social, Economic,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Convention Against Torture
(CAT), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Convention on the
Rights of Migrant Workers (CMW), and Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CRPD).
12. For example, in 2010, the CEDAW Committee adopted General
Recommendation No. 28 on “the core obligations of States parties under
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After a somewhat slow start, the Committee now regularly
adopts an explicitly intersectional approach, which will lead to
better outcomes for victims and stronger human rights
protection.
In addition to its jurisprudence, the CEDAW Committee
monitors ongoing implementation through a process of state
reporting, in which countries that have ratified the treaty
submit periodic reports detailing their progress in
implementing the treaty. Upon receipt of a state report, the
Committee engages in a dialogue with representatives from
the state, culminating in the Committee’s concluding
observations. Concluding observations allow the Committee to
highlight areas of progress in implementing the treaty as well
as challenges that remain. In the context of its concluding
observations, the Committee has many opportunities to
undertake intersectional analysis of human rights abuses. In
recent years, the Committee has occasionally used these
opportunities to adopt an intersectional lens in its dialogue
with a reporting state or in its concluding observations. The
Committee may make a passing reference to intersectional
violations but seldom probes deeply to gain a more nuanced
understanding of the human rights at stake. As I have argued
elsewhere, there is room for the CEDAW Committee and the
other treaty bodies to improve the consistency and rigor of
their intersectional human rights analysis. On a broader scale,
the U.N. should consider reforms to its institutional structure
that would eliminate the barriers that have historically
discouraged intersectional analysis of human rights violations.
Those structural reforms might take many forms, ranging from
the creation of liaisons between treaty bodies, the production of
more joint general recommendations and greater formal
collaboration between treaty bodies, perhaps even the creation
of consolidated committees that can more easily address
intersectional rights claims. Although the precise nature of
Article 2” of the CEDAW Convention. Although it did not elaborate on the
meaning of intersectionality, General Recommendation No. 28 observed that
“intersectionality is a basic concept for understanding the scope of the
general obligations of States parties contained in Article 2.” Comm. On the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation
No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties Under Article 2 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28 (Dec. 16, 2010).
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these reforms is outside the scope of this short introduction, I
hope that scholars and activists will continue to consider how
we might encourage intersectional analysis through structural
reform—a consideration undertaken by each of the
Symposium’s scholars.
These scholars situate intersectionality squarely in the
human rights frame by exploring a range of intersectional
human rights violations around the world. Jill Engle’s piece,
Sexual Violence, Intangible Harm, and the Promise of
Transformative Remedies, argues that an intersectional lens
and a transformative justice approach are necessary to fully
comprehend and remedy the harms of sexual violence. As
Engle notes, “[t]ransformative justice is well suited to address
the intangible harms in sexual violence cases where victims
experience the multiplicity of marginalization by race, gender,
and impoverishment.”13 Engle’s argument stems from the
notion that the mainstream criminal justice system in the
United States has supported structural violence against
communities of color. She advocates for the adoption of
transformative justice approaches that will offer intersectional
remedies to sexual violence victims.
Martha Davis’s contribution focuses on intersectionality
within sub-national human rights bodies. Davis notes that
ideas like intersectionality influence human rights dialogues
not only at international and regional levels but also at the
level of local government. As Davis explains, “Now that
intersectionality has moved from its U.S. origins and achieved
acceptance on the international level, as well as a measurable
degree of international integration, these same concepts of
intersectional discrimination are traveling back to domestic
contexts—not just in the United States, but worldwide . . . .”14
In Abortion Rights and Disability Equality: A New
Constitutional Battleground, Allison Whelan and Michele
Goodwin use an intersectional framework to explore the
harmful impact of abortion restrictions on historically
marginalized and vulnerable identities. They specifically focus
on the rights of disabled pregnant people and demonstrate that
13. Jill C. Engle, Sexual Violence, Intangible Harm, and the Promise of
Transformative Remedies, 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1045, 1049–50 (2022).
14. Martha F. Davis, (G)local Intersectionality, 79 WASH. & LEE. L. REV.
1021, 1026 (2022).
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“[p]ersons with disabilities, particularly those living at the
intersections of other identities, such as persons of color with
disabilities or transgender persons with disabilities,
undeniably experience the harms of abortion restrictions in
uniquely burdensome ways.”15 Whelan and Goodwin also view
intersectionality as a tool for coalition-building among different
constituencies that have shared interests in combatting
abortion restrictions. They critique the ways in which abortion
opponents have exploited historical tensions between
proponents of abortion rights and proponents of disability
rights, leading to the marginalization of pregnant persons with
disabilities in the process.
In her Comment, Shreya Atrey explores xenophobia “as a
sui generis case of intersectional discrimination because it has
to do with racial grounds but also perhaps other grounds (such
as nationality, religion, language, culture, and class), which
makes it difficult to disentangle the basis of xenophobic
discrimination as based strictly on racial grounds alone.”16
Atrey describes xenophobic discrimination as discrimination
“against [its] victims because they are not considered as
‘belonging to’ a nation or a society”17 and highlights the
substantial overlap with racial discrimination, as traditionally
defined by the CERD Committee. Atrey’s analysis reveals the
ways in which the CERD Committee’s approach would benefit
from an intersectional understanding of xenophobic
discrimination, resulting in more consistent remedies for
victims of xenophobic discrimination.
Lisa Crooms-Robinson focuses readers on the life of Pauli
Murray as an example of the lived reality of intersectionality.
Crooms-Robinson demonstrates how Murray recognized the
importance of intersectional approaches to anti-subordination
efforts well before the concept of ‘intersectionality’ gained
currency in the national and international consciousness.18

15. Whelan & Goodwin, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
1000.
16. Shreya Atrey,
Comment,
Understanding Xenophobia
as
Intersectional Discrimination, 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1007, 1007 (2022).
17. Id. at 1019.
18. See Lisa A. Crooms-Robinson, Murdering Crows: Pauli Murray,
Intersectionality, and Black Freedom, 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1093, 1095–97
(2022) (“Murray’s work at the intersection of race and sex was personified by
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Murray’s Jane Crow was foundational in her lifelong effort to
combat intersectional discrimination based on race and gender,
or the “quadruple burdens of being Black, female, poor, and
sexually non-conformist.”19 As borne out by Crooms-Robinson’s
scholarship, Murray’s work reflects a deep commitment to
intersectionality, one that has much to teach us as we seek to
apply intersectional analysis in the context of international
human rights law.
Amanda Lyons explores rurality through an intersectional
lens in Rurality as an Intersecting Axis of Inequality in the
Work of the UN Treaty Bodies. Lyons credits global agrarian
movements with shifting the understanding of rurality from
one in which rural spaces are simply viewed as a backdrop for
human rights violations, to one in which rurality is viewed as
“a unique and relevant vector in articulating people’s
identities, ways of life, culture, social innovations, and human
rights claims.”20 Lyons examines the work of the U.N. treaty
bodies, particularly the Human Rights Committee and the
U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and
traces when the committees explicitly analyzes rurality as
relevant to human rights violations. Lyons applauds these
developments, but suggests that there is much work to be done
within the treaty bodies to fully capture the structural and
systemic dimensions of rurality that contribute to rights
violations.
Together, these scholars and the other participants of the
Symposium capture intersectionality’s potential to transform
human rights discourse. Human rights actors, from activists in
the field, to scholars, to members of U.N. treaty bodies,
increasingly use an intersectional framework for human rights
analysis. The use of this framework will lead to more
comprehensive remedies for victims of human rights violations
and a better understanding of the rights at stake. By
recognizing that rights violations often do not fit neatly into
Jane Crow almost forty years before she would be understood as
‘intersectional.’”).
19. Id. at 1095 (quoting Florence Wagman Roisman, Lessons for
Advocacy from the Life and Legacy of the Reverend Doctor Pauli Murray, 20
U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, & CLASS 1, 2 (2020)).
20. Amanda Lyons, Rurality as an Intersecting Axis of Inequality in the
Work on the U.N. Treaty Bodies, 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1125, 1128 (2022).
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compartmentalized claims based solely on race, gender,
disability, age, socio-economic status, rurality, xenophobia,
religion, or sexual orientation and gender identity, we come
closer to reflecting and remedying the rights violations that
stem from intersections among these complex aspects of our
lives. Hopefully, this Symposium serves to further those
conversations.

